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ABSTRACT
Security sector reform has remained largely disconnected from the
broader debate on societal transition in the literature thus far. We
conceptualise how external support to security sector reform
could potentially facilitate socio-political order opening in a
limited access order. Based on two dimensions, we examine the
case of NATO and EU’s support to Ukraine’s security sector reform
between 2014 and 2019. NATO’s support to the military and the
EU’s support to the police and state security service (SBU) appear
unlikely to cause opening of the social order, while NATO’s
support to the military-industrial complex is more likely to cause
opening.
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Introduction
External support to security sector reform in third countries has become a prevalent tool
of state-building by the international community (Jackson 2018). Yet, the relationship
between support to security sector reform from external actors and the development
of socio-political orders in host countries remains under-developed in the literature. In
this article, we apply North, Wallis, and Weingast’s (2009) conceptualisation of social
order transition to security sector reform (SSR) support. We theorise the aspects of SSR
support that could facilitate “opening” of the social order in countries in which elites dom-
inate access to political and economic resources. These hypothetical links are illustrated
by examining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union
(EU)’s support to SSR in Ukraine between 2014 and 2019. We ask, how do NATO and
EU policies for SSR support fit with what North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) stipulate as
necessary for opening? Put differently, to what extent do external SSR policies appear
to have the potential to cause opening?
There has been some debate on the definition of security sector reform (Ansorg and
Gordon 2019), but it is commonly understood as a reform process with “the goal of creat-
ing effective and efficient state security forces, capable of providing security for the state
and its people, within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law, and respect
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for human rights” (Schröder and Chappuis 2014, 133). This process, usually supported by
external actors, inherently aims to promote democratic opening of socio-political orders.
In the wake of Ukraine’s “Revolution of Dignity”, which began in 2013 and continued
into 2014, and during an ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian government
requested assistance for its SSR process. Based on theoretical conceptualisation of how
opening could be promoted by external actors, we examine the case of the EU and
NATO’s support to SSR in Ukraine. We theorise that NATO’s support to the military as
well as the EU’s support to the police and state security service (SBU) look unlikely to
cause opening of the social order, while NATO’s support to the military-industrial
complex is more likely to cause opening.
The organisation of the article is as follows: we begin with a literature review on SSR,
noting evident gaps in the literature. We proceed by outlining North, Wallis, and Wein-
gast’s (2009) theoretical concept and link it to further concepts from the literature on
SSR and Europeanisation beyond the EU, putting forth two dimensions for evaluating
whether support to SSR could promote opening. Moving into our empirical case study,
we introduce the dynamics of Ukraine as a limited access order. We then analyse NATO
and the EU’s support to SSR in light of our dimensions for facilitating opening, before
making concluding remarks.
Conceptual discussion
Studying security sector reform: current debates and shortcomings
Although reform to a country’s security sector is technically a domestic process, security
governance has become highly internationalised with the presence of foreign donors
(Schröder 2018). The post-cold war period has been characterised by numerous inter-
national engagements in SSR. This type of reform has been seen as an essential part of
state-building, as “the provision of security and justice sits at the core of what states
are, as providers of legitimacy… and the social contract” (Jackson 2018, 3). Thus, SSR
has been put forth as a contributor to the development of sustainable peace (Jackson
and Bakrania 2018).
Yet, the development of this process has largely come from “experience on the
ground” rather than “conceptual development” (ibid., 11). The literature has typically
focused on policy studies assessing the “success” (or lack thereof) of SSR support missions
engineered by external actors (Albrecht 2019). Overall, the literature studying SSR and its
external support has largely lacked in theory (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012;
Jayasundara-Smits and Schirch 2015; Jackson and Bakrania 2018).
Furthermore, SSR literature has largely focused on the state receiving assistance as a
“black box”, without considering the agency and power of different domestic actors
(Schröder and Chappuis 2014; Jayasundara-Smits and Schirch 2015, 16). Jackson and Bak-
rania (2018) note that the domestic division of power and the control of institutions
remain the crucial factors underlying success in international peacebuilding. They posit
the lack of interrogation of the relationship between actors within domestic security
structures as highly problematic to the continued practice of external support to SSR.
We argue that new theoretical conceptualisations are needed for studying how SSR
support fits into the broader context of socio-political development. In this regard,
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North, Wallis, and Weingast’s conceptual framework, which particularly emphasises the
role of local security, political, and economic elites in socio-political development,
could shed light on the dynamics behind a limited access order receiving support.
The EU and NATO as SSR external actors
Juxtaposing the SSR support given by NATO and the EU offers the opportunity to analyse
the potential of different approaches to influence social order transformation. The EU and
NATO have both become major actors in the field of SSR. Despite the evident shortcom-
ings of “Western” assistance,1 their engagement continues to be sought by countries on
the European continent interested in cooperation or membership. Yet, there is a “distinct
difference of institutional political logic” between NATO and the EU (Bynander 2011, 157),
which may have implications for their SSR assistance. The EU has been considered a “civi-
lian power” (Whitman 2002) or “trade power” (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006), which has
added security to its policy portfolio over time, whereas NATO was convened as a politi-
cal-military alliance to deal with hard security issues, although it is also transforming in
light of new threats perceptions (Bynander 2011, 157–158).
Conceptualisation of the potential influence of NATO and the EU as SSR actors, particu-
larly towards post-Soviet transition states, has remained limited. The literature evaluating
NATO or EU SSR missions from a policy studies perspective has largely focused on the
Middle East or Africa (Sedra 2006, 2013; Schröder et al. 2013; Schröder 2014), rather
than on Eastern European transition states (Simons 2012 on Georgia is an exception).
In the “eastern neighbourhood”, NATO and the EU appear to approach SSR support differ-
ently in light of the geopolitical context (Tytarchuk and Khylko 2016; Jayasundara-Smits
2018). Studies of EU and/or NATO demands or assistance related to SSR has primarily
focused on Central European membership accession countries (see Jacoby 2004;
Dowling 2008; Melnykovska and Schweickert 2011). Ultimately, support to SSR – some-
times not under this official label – has been an important part of the EU’s transformation,
partnership, and enlargement policy (Buxton 2008) and could benefit from further study.
Linking security sector reform to social order transition
To remedy the theoretical shortcomings of the literature on SSR and link this reform to
social order transition, we first build on North, Wallis, and Weingast’s (hereafter referred
to as NWW, 2009) conceptual framework. As NWW’s concept is relatively broad and
focused on internal dynamics, we complement this with insights from the literature on
SSR as well as literature on Europeanisation beyond the EU’s borders.
NWW (2009, 2011) put forth the internal logic of two social orders: the limited access
order (LAO), in which privileged elites control violence through distributing political and
economic resources amongst themselves, and the open access order (OAO), in which a
legitimate state monopoly on violence allows open competition for political and econ-
omic resources amongst wider society. For a LAO to transition into an OAO, the “dominant
coalition” of elites in society, must first meet “doorstep conditions”: establish impersonal
rule of law amongst themselves, adopt sustainable public and private institutions across
sectors that exist independent of the identity of their members, and consolidate political
control over violence (NWW 2009, 26).
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Yet, NWW do not discuss the security sector in-depth. Giustozzi (2011, 3) has also cri-
tiqued that the historically-based conceptual framework may not necessarily shed light
on all the dynamics facing LAOs in modern times. We aim to fill this gap by applying
NWW’s logic to the SSR support deployed by external actors.
Dimensions of opening facilitated by external SSR support
SSR has been considered to encompass a wide range of reforms, from those that seek to
strengthen the state’s “enforcement capacities” in the traditional security sense, to those
that are more rule of law-oriented governance reforms, which aim to restrict the state
(Schröder and Kode 2012, 31). So-called security assistance or military aid belonging to
the first grouping has often been called SSR support by international donors or in the lit-
erature, although this is increasingly seen as separate from SSR’s comprehensive or devel-
opment aims (Wulf 2011).
Unlike Tilly (1992), NWW (2009) do not credit military advancements driven by warfare,
to which external actors might provide traditional military aid, as a main driver of social
order transition. There is some support for this view in the SSR literature, based on empiri-
cal evidence that building up state enforcement capacity without adequate institutional
governance measures could be used to stabilise a limited access order (Krieg 2017), could
exacerbate conflict, or institutionalise existing cleavages in a society (Schröder and Kode
2012, 32–33). The literature on the EU and NATO’s SSR assistance to conflict countries in
Africa and the Middle East has shown privileging “train and equip” missions to tackle
immediate threats over longer-term security governance reforms has often perpetuated
insecurity or damaged wider institution-building efforts (Sedra 2006, 2013; Schröder 2014;
Jayasundara-Smits and Schirch 2015). Ultimately, while the primary task of the military is
providing national security (Sherr 2001), in the logic of NWW, assistance focused solely on
military aid would likely promote the status quo, rather than social order opening.
Drawing on NWW’s framework and the Europeanisation beyond the EU literature, we
theorise that to promote transition to an open socio-political order, SSR support would
need to address two dimensions. First, it would need to target support to specific criteria
based on NWW’s doorstep conditions: political control over agents of force, specialised,
impersonal institutions, and impersonal rules governing the use of force. Second, there
would need to be an incentive for elites to accept support if it directly targets the criteria,
taking into consideration the logic of the LAO.
First dimension: criteria for transition
Political control
Privileged elites in LAOs only agree to consolidate the use of force to designated agents
(i.e. police and military organisations) if political control can be exercised over them under
credible conventions, preventing the risk “of the state using violence for its own ends”
(NWW 2009, 21–22). A major concern here is ensuring that “the military is out of politics”
and “out of power” (Sherr 2001, 1). Yet, “control” should be understood as supporting
measures associated with “checking” or “oversight”, rather than political actors giving
“direction” or dictating security professionals (ibid., 2). This can be exercised through rel-
evant political authorities determining the amount of resources allocated to the military
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(NWW 2009, 171) through effective parliamentary oversight (Wulf 2011). While meeting
this criterion is necessary for opening, impersonal institutions and rules tend to be the
drivers of transition, with effective political control following (Gollwitzer Franke and
Quintyn 2014, 229). Institution of political control does not necessarily drive the other
conditions (ibid.).
Specialised, impersonal institutions
In order for political control to be effectively exercised, elites must develop organisations
that specialise in different functions – public and private institutions across sectors – and
are granted the authority to make decisions in these areas on an impersonal basis (NWW
2009, 171). This aims to severe the “close links among economics, politics and military”
resources, which are controlled by the dominant coalition (ibid., 169). Agents of violence
in particular should become more specialised and complex (ibid., 46). Delineation of com-
petences between different security forces aims to prevent force from being used illegiti-
mately (Wulf 2011, 344).
Impersonal rules governing the use of force2
Transition is not only about whether the security sector is supervised by the political
system, but about how the use of force is restricted with “appropriate rules governing
the use of violence” that are first agreed upon by elites and then extended to wider
society (ibid., 114). These rules “must be impersonal” (ibid., 121) and codify how, when,
and by whom violence can be used (Sherr 2001). Members of the dominant coalition
are thereby prevented from “translating their control of security and organised violence
into personal or institutional gain” through political power or economic resources
(Luckham and Kirk 2013, 15).
Second dimension: incentives
Targeting the above criteria would challenge the informal linkages between political,
economic, and security elites and resources and thus the balance of power in the LAO
as well as their ability to collect rents. We can therefore anticipate resistance from
elites in these same areas. Building on NWW, we theorise that SSR support is more
likely to promote opening if it both targets the criteria and also provides incentives for
the elites involved to accept support in these areas. As NWW conceptualise, elites may
grant access when it appears in “their [own] interest to move towards impersonal intra-
elite [institutional] arrangements” (NWW 2009, 25, see also 26, 143, 150). These initial
changes must be “consistent with the interests” of the dominant coalition, though the
“results…may be unintended” and cause greater opening than expected (ibid., 150).3
NWW do not provide assumptions about the relationship between external support
and domestic change, aside from cautioning that external actors must heed the logic
of the LAO (ibid., 264; NWW 2011, 4). The literature on Europeanisation beyond the EU
provides a basis for theoretical assumptions in this regard. This literature has confirmed
that “despite EU membership aspirations and pro-Western foreign policy orientations”,
EU standards may indeed meet resistance (Delcour 2016, 61). External actors can
influence the interests or “cost–benefit considerations” of domestic actors through a
variety of different measures Langbein and Börzel 2013; (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
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2004), or what we consider broadly as “incentives”. The cost of change may be mitigated
by either policy conditionality, which links rewards to complying with certain standards,
or targeted capacity-building towards key actors (Ademmer and Börzel 2013). Capacity-
building can be broadly understood as activities “intended to strengthen the target
state institution to perform its specified functions”, including technical or financial aid
(Radin 2020). We conceptualise that the presence of incentives appearing in the interest
of the dominant coalition makes SSR support more likely to cause opening (Table 1).
Empirical case study
We use the case of NATO and the EU’s SSR assistance to post-Maidan Ukraine in order to
illustrate empirically the hypothetical links between external SSR support and social order
opening. This provides an interesting case due to the assessment of Ukraine as a LAO that
is likely for transition as well as the heightened SSR support provided by NATO and the EU
since 2014.
We chose to focus on support from NATO and the EU as these two international organ-
isations have had a highly visible role in SSR in Ukraine across military and civilian security
institutions. We nevertheless recognise the important presence of many other domestic,
bilateral, and international actors in the SSR process.4 The EU and NATO have engaged in
the reform of Ukraine’s security sector on an unprecedented level since 2014,5 throughout
the presidencies of Petro Poroshenko (2014–2019) and Volodymyr Zelensky (2019-). This
article limits its focus to the time of Poroshenko, although a few empirical examples from
Zelensky’s time are included.
Ukraine
Ukraine could be classified as a LAO with relatively high political and economic access as
compared to other countries in the region, leaving some room for “domestic hooks” that
external actors could use to promote opening (Ademmer, Langbein, and Börzel 2019,
205). Relative to other LAOs in the region, it is one of the most likely cases for opening
(ibid.; Vilpišauskas et al. in this volume). Yet, despite repeated political upheavals and
formal changes of the government in the last decades, Ukrainian political and economic
elites have largely replicated a model of oligarchic governance (Kostiuchenko and Melny-
kovska 2019). Transition to an OAO in this case would require targeted and extensive effort
onbehalf of external actors, as the LAO is otherwise likely to remain stable (Ademmer, Lang-
bein, and Börzel 2019, 205). Ukraine’s security sector in particular is known to offer a major
Table 1. Theoretical conceptualisation of how dimensions of SSR support hypothetically relate to
social order opening.
SSR support provided by external actor
Focuses on criteria relevant to transition
Yes No
Presence of incentives Opening likely Reform possible, but may not cause
opening
No or limited presence of
incentives
Reform unlikely, will not cause
opening
Opening unlikely
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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source of rent-seeking for elites in terms of potential political power and ability to collect
economic resources (Ivashchenko-Stadnik et al. 2018). Hence, reform to Ukraine’s security
sector could be a key aspect of its transition to an OAO.
The context
A LAO government choosing to initiate extensive reform of its security sector might be
considered unlikely to begin with, considering that this could undermine “the power
bases of the elite” (Jackson 2018, 3) and challenge the mechanisms that sustain the
LAO. In Ukraine, the government’s decision to increase SSR efforts in 20146 was prompted
by the reaction to brutal suppression during the “Revolution of Dignity” protests and the
outbreak of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. After President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision
to end talks on a Ukraine-EU Association Agreement in November 2013, pro-European
Ukrainians demonstrated for months on Kyiv’s Maidan square. These protests were
largely against the corruption of President Yanukovych’s regime (Fluri and Badrack
2016). Berkut forces, an elite riot police run by the Ministry of Interior, violently tried to
disperse the demonstrators on multiple occasions, resulting in over a hundred fatalities
and around a thousand injuries (ibid.; BBC April 4, 2014).
In the power vacuum that occurred after President Yanukovych fled the country in Feb-
ruary 2014, Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014. Pro-Russian separatists then made
several bids to overthrow local government institutions in eastern Ukraine, resulting in
the ongoing conflict between these forces and the Ukrainian armed forces. The Ukrainian
security institutions that existed in March 2014 “were unable to respond effectively to the
emerging conflict in Eastern Ukraine” (Oliker et al. 2016, xiv) and also fell short in terms of
legitimate use of force during the Revolution of Dignity (Litra, Medynskyi, and Zarembo
2017, 28). This context prompted Ukraine to launch a comprehensive review of its security
sector and to ask for increased foreign assistance.
NATO’s approach: a brief overview
Ukraine was the first post-Soviet country to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme
in 1994. During the time in which Ukraine was officially non-aligned, cooperation
remained primarily on the level of professional trainings for the military.7 This changed
after the conflict in Eastern Ukraine broke out in 2014. In 2017, Ukraine’s law on
foreign policy officially declared desire for Euro-Atlantic integration, and in 2019, the Ver-
khovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, officially backed amending the constitution to expli-
citly state Ukraine’s path towards NATO and the EU (Unian, February 7, 2019).
Since 2014, NATO has increased its presence in Ukraine. The NATO Representation to
Ukraine now encompasses both the NATO Liaison Office and the NATO Information and
Documentation Centre.8 The former is part of the Political Affairs and Security Policy div-
ision of NATO, while the latter is engaged in strategic communication towards Ukrainian
elites and public and facilitates stakeholder meetings. At the onset of its increased assist-
ance in 2014, NATO primarily focused on the armed forces and Ministry of Defence.9 In
2016, it increased its engagement to the security sector more broadly,10 providing
support to the National Guard, Border Guard Service, parliament, the Ministry of Interior,
State Security Service of Ukraine, and civil society.11
EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS 165
The EU’s approach: a brief overview
Ukraine’s relationship with the EU was formalised with a Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement in 1994 (EEAS 2019) and in 2009 it became part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership
programme. However, the EU only began to factor a clear security dimension into its
approach to Ukraine after the events of 2014 (Litra, Medynskyi, and Zarembo 2017),
despite the 2009 Eastern Partnership’s declared aims of delivering security and prosperity
to the country (European Commission 2009). The 2015 European Neighbourhood Policy
review proposed stronger security cooperation, portraying the EU’s Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) missions to Ukraine as an important part of this (European Commis-
sion 2017a). While the EU has emphasised the importance of both civilian and military
capabilities in its strategic documents about SSR support (European Commission 2016),
all assistance provided to Ukraine has been civilian.
The EU’s support to SSR in Ukraine has primarily occurred through the European Union
Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM), which launched in 2014 and is under the CSDP.12
These efforts should complement the EU’s wider state-building support to other
sectors through the Association Agreement and Support Group for Ukraine. EUAM has
been engaged in assistance to the Ministry of Interior, National Police, SBU, State
Border Guard Service, General Prosecutor’s Office, local courts, the parliament and civil
society (EUAM 2020).
Empirical analysis
The following sections analyse NATO and the EU’s support to SSR in light of the dimen-
sions that we conceptualise as relevant to social order opening.13 Looking at the SSR
support the EU and NATO have provided, we selected four areas receiving support.
Based on an empirical analysis of these four areas using our theoretical dimensions, we
present the least through most likely areas where external support to SSR may cause
opening in Ukraine’s LAO: the military, the police, the SBU, and the military-industrial
complex (Table 2).
The data was gathered through interviews carried out in Kyiv in September and
October 2017, October and November 2018, and October 2019 as well as remotely,
with independent security experts, government and non-government think tank
members, representatives of the Ukrainian government, European diplomats and
Table 2. Classification of empirical cases based on theoretical expectations for link between SSR
support and social order opening.
SSR support provided by external actor
Focuses on criteria relevant to transition
Yes No
Presence of incentives NATO: Military-industrial complex
(Opening likely)
NATO: Military
(Reform possible, but may not cause
opening)
No or limited presence of
incentives
EU: Police, SBU
(Reform unlikely, will not cause
opening)
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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attachés, as well as NATO and EU officials. The original data has been complemented by
strategic documents and secondary sources.
NATO support to the military: unlikely to cause opening
First dimension: some political control, lots of security assistance
In the context of Ukraine, it should first be noted that the military itself has not had a
pivotal role in perpetuating the nature of the LAO. Even in Soviet times, the military
was largely not “politically ambitious” and was subject to “policy, rather than the
master”, operating with a fair degree of professionalism (Sherr 2001, 1). In Ukraine, the
internal security agencies have been more problematic in terms of their lack of political
control under clearly defined rules (ibid., 3). Informal control of the internal security
agencies as one of multiple centres of power14 has been one way of stabilising the LAO.
NATO has been the main external actor in support to reforming Ukraine’s military. The
core over-arching goals of NATO’s assistance has been to “strengthen democratic and civi-
lian control of Ukraine’s armed forces and security institutions” (NATO 2019a) and boost
Ukraine’s ability to provide for its own security (NATO 2019b). Its strategic-level advice has
been consolidated alongside technical assistance and capacity-building under NATO’s
Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) (NATO 2016).15 Enacted in 2016, the CAP has
aimed to support the objectives of Ukraine’s Strategic Defence Bulletin, which was
drafted with NATO assistance and states Ukraine’s aspiration to reform its armed forces
according to NATO standards and achieve interoperability with NATO forces by 2020.
This also includes “trust funds” worth 14 million euro to help Ukraine upgrade its
defence system.16 These trust funds are voluntary, nationally-led and funded projects
in vital areas such as C4 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers). On a
bilateral level but within the NATO framework, the United States (US), Canada, Poland,
and Lithuania, have also provided training and military aid to the Ukrainian armed
forces.17
A vast amount of overall support provided by NATO concerns security assistance to the
conflict in Ukraine’s east, rather than SSR targeting the criteria for transition. Given the
relative lack of utility of the military to the dominant coalition prior to 2014, military
reform and funding were neglected during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych from
2010 to 2014 (Melnyk and Sungurovsky 2013). Circa 2014, the armed forces were
largely ill-equipped to effectively combat a military threat to the central Ukrainian govern-
ment on the country’s territory (Oliker et al. 2016). This has been a focal point of NATO’s
assistance due to its own security interest in preventing further escalation of the conflict
or loss of further Ukrainian sovereign territory.
In terms of SSR support, NATO consulted heavily on the drafting of Ukraine’s “Law on
National Security”,18 towards the aim of installing civilian control measures and defining
the relationship and competences of Ukraine’s security institutions within a legal frame-
work. While Ukraine already established a parliamentary committee in the 1990s with the
purview of overseeing the defence budget – the Committee for Security and Defense – in
actuality it has not been performing this function effectively.19 The committee has often
lacked expertise, faced resistance from the executive, and lacked access to detailed infor-
mation regarding defence expenditures due to current over-classification (Bugriy and
Maksak 2016).20 NATO advised that specification of the parliament’s role in supervision
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be included in the new national security law (National Institute for Strategic Studies 2018).
It also stipulated the need for a civilian defence minister by 1 January 2019.
NATO’s support has been invaluable in terms of supporting Ukraine’s military as
regards immediate threats to its national security, but this aspect has dominated its
focus. Such superficial attempts at refining political control over the military look unlikely
to cause opening in light of the military’s relatively weak role in the LAO and due to the
lack of impersonal, specialised institutions, which would allow for more effective political
control in practice. In this case, it looks unlikely that this aspect of NATO’s SSR support will
cause opening.
It should be noted that part of NATO’s engagement happened through the “inter-
national advisory group” to Ukraine. This informal advisory body consists of NATO, the
US, and the EU (both the EU Delegation and EUAM), and has met ad hoc, at times on a
daily basis. The group has focused on SSR, coordinating joint steps and its messaging
to the Ukrainian government and public. The international advisory group consulted
on the national security law21 and supported conditioning US military aid on its
passage.22 The new national security law ultimately passed in 2018, including a clause
on the need for a civilian defence minister but maintaining the hierarchy of the executive
as dominant in supervision over the sector (Tregub 2018). NATO bilaterally and the advi-
sory group have continued to call for the law’s implementation and development of sec-
ondary legislature in political statements (NATO 2019b).
Second dimension: big incentives
In light of NATO’s assistance to the military being primarily focused on security assistance
and rather modestly playing a role in facilitating political control over security in the LAO,
it is unlikely to cause opening. Nevertheless, there have been multiple incentives present
in this area that still make elites prone to accept assistance, even if this merely promotes
the status quo. Post-2014, NATO supported Ukraine’s membership aspirations, though
this was not yet what would be considered official support to NATO accession.23 While
Ukraine has not been granted a Membership Action Plan, the Annual National Pro-
grammes of Ukraine-NATO cooperation have specifically emphasised democratic
reforms and “performance” is concretely assessed by allies on a yearly basis. In June
2020, NATO also granted Ukraine an “Enhanced Opportunities Partner”, a further signal
of deeper partnership (NATO 2020). Alignment with NATO has become increasingly
attractive to the Ukrainian elite since 2014 in light of the perceived security guarantee
it brings (Samokhvalov 2015).
Furthermore, NATO has linked its reform agendas on civilian control on a declaratory
level and in its advisory capacity when drafting new strategic documents to its military
aid.24 As noted, conditionality was used regarding US military aid25 through international
advisory group to ensure passage of the new national security law,26 although the law
ultimately did not fully comply with all NATO recommendations. Security assistance
from NATO member states has been perceived as key to reform of the Ukrainian armed
forces’ training system, which was particularly important in the first stage of the
conflict,27 and it has therefore been in the interest of elites go ahead with some reform
linked to this. Ukrainian elites claim that military institutions and instruments should be
the primary focus in light of the imminent threat posed by war in the east.28 There has
been some questioning on the Ukrainian side of whether civilian control measures
168 E. SHEA AND M. JAROSZEWICZ
should really be a priority during a time of war.29 In this regard, security interests also
seem to predominate for the external actors, as military aid has been provided despite
a lack of full compliance with NATO reform demands.
EU support to the police: unlikely to cause opening
First dimension: attempts at impersonal rules
While the military may not have typically been instrumentalised in Ukraine’s LAO to main-
tain the balance of power or distribute rents in the dominant coalition, the predecessor to
the police has played an important role. During Yanukovych’s presidency, policing func-
tions were carried out by the “militsiya”, a state-protection apparatus that was integrated
within the Ministry of Interior (European Commission 2017b). These forces under instruc-
tion of the Ministry of Interior were often used to “to defend the Yanukovych ‘family’ and
protect oligarchs’ businesses” (Peleschuk 2014). This marked a “tradition of regime poli-
cing” in Ukraine, where personalised decisions on the use of force were carried out in
exchange for privileges (Friesendorf 2019, 111–112). The Ministry of Interior itself has his-
torically served as a “police ministry” with a mix of security and political interests (Euro-
pean Commission 2017b), which were often used in pursuit of hoarding economic
resources (Friesendorf 2019).
EUAM has been the external actor most involved in the reform of the Ministry of Interior
and National Police. Launched in December 2014, EUAM notably presents itself as a reac-
tion to the Maidan revolution, rather than the conflict in Ukraine’s east (EUAM 2020). This
CSDP mission has stipulated goals of Ukraine achieving “a civilian security sector that is
efficient, accountable, and enjoys the trust of the public” (ibid.). While not stated in its
official mission, EUAM has also championed “civil democratic control” at the core of its
assistance, though referring to oversight of civilian rather than military institutions.30
During its initial operation in 2014–2015 in Kyiv, EUAM largely centred on influencing
the strategic level of decision-making and institution-building (Litra, Medynskyi, and
Zarembo 2017). While the US and Georgia were also highly influential in the process,31
the EU provided instrumental strategic-level advice to prepare the final version of the
law “On National Police”, which the Rada passed in July 2015. This assistance aimed at cre-
ation of the National Police as a legal entity, designating the use of force to this institution
under a defined, impersonal set of rules.32
EUAM’s approach evolved after the mission’s first review in 2015, adding more “hands
on” assistance and opening up field offices in Lviv, Odesa, and Kharkiv (Zarembo 2017;
Ivashchenko-Stadnik et al. 2018). It established four working groups that have provided
strategic advice to assist with implementing the newly created structures, such as the
patrol police and criminal investigation troops.33 It furthermore introduced the concept
of “community policing” to Ukraine, which emphasises cooperation and dialogue with
citizens as well as hands on training to public order policing based on EU best practices
(Bulakh 2018).
EUAM has clearly targeted support towards helping the police operate with impersonal
rules, which is critical to ultimately establishing political control and especially critical
given the predecessor to the police’s role in perpetuating the LAO. Unfortunately,
EUAM’s major targeting of the criteria appears insufficient in light of the lack of incentives
presented by its support and thus unlikely to cause opening.
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Second dimension: few incentives
Changing the operation of policing forces in Ukraine would require significant incentives,
considering how critical they have been to the functioning of the LAO and the balance of
power. Despite the efforts of the EUAM, there is already empirical evidence that police
reform has been superficial or rolled-back in light of the alleged continued stranglehold
of the Ministry of Interior over the police (Friesendorf 2019; Bivings 2020). On the one
hand, there has been more support to reform accepted in the first place than we
might have expected given the lack of incentives. This may be due to the heavy engage-
ment of the US, which might be viewed more favourably by Ukrainians as a security pro-
vider, in the early stages of police reform. On the other hand, dynamics in the LAO appear
to persist. The interior ministry, with the police under it, has continued to serve as one
centre of power in the LAO, while the SBU remains directly supervised by the president.34
While Ukraine signed an EU Association Agreement in 2014, the majority of SSR falls
outside of the policy areas stipulated as needing to be in line with the EU’s internal
rules. In 2015, some criteria regarding border control and rule of law was necessary for
Ukraine to sign its visa free agreement with the EU in 2015 (Litra, Medynskyi, and
Zarembo 2017). Since then, there has been no explicit positive or negative incentives pre-
sented by the EU as linked to the security sector.
Furthermore, elites in Ukraine’s dominant coalition view the EU as an economic actor,
while NATO is seen as a security actor.35 In this regard, given that the EU neither presents
concrete economic benefits or military assistance in reward for continued reform
implementation, it is difficult to imagine that deeper SSR support to police reform will
be accepted by elites or lead to opening.
EU support to the SBU: unlikely to cause opening
First dimension: striving for impersonal institutions & rules
The SBU inherited the legal framework, resources, and facilities of the Ukrainian branch of
the Soviet KBG (Gressel 2019). It has had a broad range of competences ranging from mili-
tarised counter-intelligence capabilities, which have been deployed as part of its war-
fighting effort in the East, to a law enforcement body (ibid.). The SBU has also had the com-
petence of gathering counterintelligence to “protect the economic security of Ukraine”
(Roslycky and Tregub 2018). According to Transparency International, amongst others,
the SBU has allegedly been using its mix of force and intelligence competences to interfere
in business interests and enforce monopolies of certain economic sectors (Roslycky and
Tregub 2018; Transparency International 2018; Ustinova and Pifer 2019).
The political elites in Ukraine have been alleged to occasionally use the SBU to monitor
opponents (Oliker et al. 2016, 14; Miller 2019), which is facilitated by the fact that it only
has to report directly to the president (Gressel 2019). The existing parliamentary commit-
tee for security and defence sector has not had the purview of overseeing the activities of
the intelligence community, including the security service, despite the SBU’s role as an
agent of force (Ustinova and Pifer 2019). In this regard, the SBU exists outside of political
control and is not specialised. As a key instrument of elites in the LAO, it is highly likely to
resist change.
Reform of the SBU is under the EUAM’s purview, but NATO and the EU have collabo-
rated heavily on assistance to this area through the international advisory group. They
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drew up a reform proposal in 2016 to outline how the SBU could be brought in line with
NATO standards (Miller 2019). This proposal centred on “transforming the SBU into a
modern and effective Western-style intelligence agency concentrated only on counter-
espionage, counter-terror and security analysis” (EUAM 2019). It foresaw removing the
SBU’s ability to additionally function as a weaponised law enforcement body fighting
economic crimes and corruption, which has been one aspect of its abuse of force. The
international advisory group demanded that provisions regarding further delineation of
the SBU’s competences be included in the new national security law and that it should
foresee the creation of a new parliamentary committee on intelligence (Gressel 2019).
Ultimately, the 2018 national security law noted the need for further SBU reform and
excluded pursuance of economic crime from its purview, but no secondary legislature
or concrete implementation of these outlined changes have taken place (ibid.).
EUAM has clearly targeted the criteria of specialised, impersonal institutions and rules
in seeking to limit the SBU’s purview. It has also sought to install some degree of political
control by advocating for a separate parliamentary oversight committee for this unmoni-
tored area of the security sector. Due to the critical role of the SBU in stabilising the LAO, it
will likely remain highly resistant to change in this area, unless the dominant coalition
faces more attractive incentives, which it presently does not.
Second dimension: few EU (or NATO) incentives
While the EU, with support from NATO, has targeted impersonal, specialised institutions and
rules with its support to reform of the SBU, we expect that the approach is too weak in terms
of its incentives for local elites. Aside from early pressure from the international advisory
group to include language on delineating competences of the SBU in the national security
law, which was successful, there has been no further conditionality attached to secondary
legislature on the SBU. Even at the end of 2020, no concrete reform of the SBU has taken
place. Given the dual role of the SBU as a perpetuator of the LAO through its alleged useful-
ness to political elites and their business interests (Roslycky and Tregub 2018) as well as its
engagement in the conflict in the east due to its force capabilities (Gressel 2019), there is
little incentive for domestic elites to agree to reform. Furthermore, it is evident that NATO
and the EU as external actors may have their own security interests to prioritise in terms of
which tools and areas they emphasise in SSR support. Given the threat posed by the
conflict in EasternUkraine, the external actorsmay have chosen not to condition furthermili-
tary aid for Ukraine on concrete SBU reformprogress. A delay inmilitary aid for Ukraine could
havehadnegative effects on the country’s ability to defend itself, potentially resulting in spill-
over for Europeanpartners. Opening is thus not likely to be causedby SSR support in this area
with the current approach.
NATO support to the military-industrial complex: likely to cause opening
First dimension: moving towards impersonal, specialised institutions
Defence procurement and the regulatory framework surrounding it in Ukraine have
remained “critically Soviet” in that much information is classified by an opaque system
without clear rules (Dieniezhna 2020). Circa 2014, there was no body within the Ukrainian
government responsible for this area, although formally the Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment has been responsible on a general level (Tregub 2018). In practice, the Ukrainian
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state-owned defence conglomerate Ukroboronprom has been setting policy in this area
(ibid.) and allegedly influencing defence procurement decisions of the Ministry of
Defence (NAKO 2017), characteristic of the linkages between business interests and
control of military resources in a LAO. Ukroboronprom’s ability to set policies for its
own sector has also allowed it to block economic competition in the sector as it currently
holds a “licensing stranglehold over military exports” (Holmov 2018).
Furthermore, Ukraine’s antiquated law “On State Secret” does not stipulate clear cri-
teria for classification of sensitive national security information. In this sense, it is still
based on the Soviet model, where decisions were primarily made on a personal basis.
Items like the detailed defence budget, the state defence order (the annual armaments
and military equipment procurement plan), and security assistance requirements have
remained classified (NAKO 2017). Without guidelines in place, roughly 90% of Ukraine’s
defence budget has become classified,36 making oversight virtually impossible.37 The
lack of oversight has allegedly led to several corruption schemes related to procurement
involving security officials (Roslycky and Tregub 2018).38 In this regard, the military-indus-
trial complex has a strong role in perpetuating the LAO, as these informal links between
military and business officials enables rent distribution in the dominant coalition.
NATO has provided assistance based on its core value of competitive market economy
as well as principles of accountability and transparency aimed at bringing trust and confi-
dence to the sector.39 It engaged in the promotion of impersonal, specialised institutions
through its assistance to reform of classified information and regulation of the military-
industrial complex, including defence procurement. It first provided strategic reform
advice to the law on national security, encouraging a clause mandating the creation of
a designated signing institution to oversee defence procurement be included. It also sup-
ported the development of secondary legislature, such as a new law on defence procure-
ment – Law of Ukraine “On the State Defense Order” – which has been modelled on the
transparent unified procedure of procurement similar to what is practiced in many NATO
member nations (Ponomarenko 2020). Such a law would exclude Ukroboronprom as an
obligatory intermediary in the procurement of arms abroad, which should instead be con-
ducted directly by the Ministry of Defence.40 A next tranche of US military aid was made
conditional on reform progress towards transparent direct procurement of military goods
(Ustinova and Pifer 2019; CNN June 11, 2020). In July 2020, this law passed, paving the way
for an open electronic registry of suppliers and manufacturers (Piontkovsky 2020). It fur-
thermore supported the Ukrainian government’s decision in 2019 to implement an inter-
national audit of Ukroboronprom. This effort aimed at providing advice on corporate
governance of the conglomerate in order to prevent corruption and make it more com-
petitive (Tregub 2018).
NATO has also been the official lead on advising reform efforts to find an impartial
system for determining classification of information related to national security, perpetu-
ating specialisation in this field as well as an impersonal system. It provided strategic
advice to reform of how classified information is managed based on its own standards,
as NATO members typically classify only around 10–20% of their budgets.41 Its four-tier
classification system, which has concrete criteria for classification, is serving as a potential
guideline for a future law on “state secrets” (Gressel 2019). The 2018 national security law
ultimately stipulated the need for a new law on state secrets with concrete criteria for
when information can be classified. NATO’s extensive strategic advice towards Ukraine
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developing an impersonal system for classified information and defence procurement
should facilitate specialisation and impersonalisation of the military-industrial complex.
In combination with the incentives it has provided, its support to this area looks most
likely to cause opening.
Compelling incentives
Given that the military-industrial complex in Ukraine has been far from fulfilling the cri-
teria of specialised, impersonal institutions and clear rules for the system, NATO would
need to offer significant incentives to these areas in order for elites to be willing to
defy the logic of the LAO. This is particularly true given the current context, whereby
some elites believe you cannot be as transparent when you are at war.42
NATO used a range of frameworks and incentives to encourage reform in compliance
with its standards. It used Ukraine’s detailed Annual National Programme, which is jointly
agreed with Ukraine and updated yearly, to specify aims of meeting market regulations
for the defence industry in line with Euro-Atlantic standards. Within the framework of
NATO, the US has also been highly engaged in encouraging reform of Ukraine’s mili-
tary-industrial complex, which might bring tangible security and economic benefits for
external actors down the line. Demonstration of progress towards institutional reform
in the sector was tied to continued US military assistance in 2020, as the US would
only continue to provide this aid if sufficient criteria were met in this sector (Ustinova
and Pifer 2019; CNN June 11, 2020). Given that Ukraine is fighting an armed conflict
and relies on this aid, this was clear incentive to implement reforms in this area. The Ukrai-
nian-Russian clash in the Kerch straight in 2018 only further drove the Ukrainian political
elite to seek security assistance from NATO (Maass 2019). Because NATO has offered
extensive support to an area that is highly in need and relevant to transition and has
also offered attractive incentives, it is likely that its SSR support could cause opening.
NATO and the EU: promoting opening in times of crisis in Ukraine?
In this article, we theorised how external support to security sector reform could promote
transition from a limited to an open access order. Building on North, Wallis, and Wein-
gast’s (2009) logics of socio-political order transition, we conceptualised two dimensions
for analysing how SSR support might promote opening. First, it would need to target
support to specific criteria in order to transition: political control over agents of force,
impersonal, specialised institutions, and rules governing the use of force. Second, there
would need to be incentives for elites to accept support that does target the criteria,
taking into consideration the logic of the LAO. Depending on whether the support
from external actors targets the necessary criteria and whether incentives are present,
support may be more or less likely to cause opening. Deploying this framework, we ana-
lysed NATO and the EU’s SSR assistance to post-Maidan Ukraine, particularly concentrat-
ing on four areas: the military, the police, SBU, and military-industrial complex. We asked,
to what extent do external SSR policies appear to have the potential to cause opening?
In looking at the SSR support that NATO provided to Ukraine, we conceptualised its
support to the military as not very likely to cause opening, while its support to the mili-
tary-industrial complex was likely to cause opening. Incentives have been present for the
dominant coalition in both areas of support targeted by NATO, which we theorise as an
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important aspect of making it SSR support more likely to be accepted. US military assist-
ance through the NATO framework has been particularly linked to progress in both areas
of reform, such as the new law on national security in 2018 and “On the State Defense
Order” in 2020.
NATO’s support to the military largely dealt with security assistance in light of the war
and rather shallowly dealt with political control, bringing about reform but not making it
likely to cause opening. Its support to the military-industrial complex, however, compre-
hensively targeted the creation of specialised, impersonal institutions via reform to
defence procurement and efforts at a more transparent system of classification for secur-
ity-related data. Based on our empirical analysis of Ukraine, it looks unlikely that political
control over the military will be effective until specialised, impersonal institutions are
more fully in place in the military-industrial complex. In this regard, the need for an imper-
sonal system for classification of sensitive information is urgent.
The EU’s support to reform of both the SBU and the police has been largely devoid of
incentives. The lack of concrete economic or security incentives attached to the EU’s SSR
support, particularly as compared to the military aid linked to NATO’s support, provides
little reason for the dominant coalition to opt out of their current system of rent-
seeking. In the context of Ukraine’s LAO, both the police and the SBU have played a
major role in perpetuating the order and are thus likely to be particularly resistant to
change. Thus, even though the EU has targeted support to impersonal, specialised insti-
tutions and rules through advisory and capacity-building efforts towards the SBU and the
police, its support looks unlikely to cause opening. EU support to police reform advanced
further than we would have expected and may have had some tangible security benefits
for citizens, but has already shown signs of reversal.
Overall, in the unique context of Ukraine’s wide-ranging reform efforts while at war, the
security imperative and heightened geopolitical tension surrounding the conflict appear
to have re-invigorated the attractiveness of closer cooperation with NATO and military aid
in particular. The role of the US remains critical here. The EU has been less able to link its
support to tangible incentives and continues to be perceived as an economic rather than
security actor by the dominant coalition, which we conceptualise as harming its ability to
deliver SSR support that might cause opening. There is some evidence of security inter-
ests on the part of external actors as well, given that conditionality attached to economic
or military aid has not been fully applied or is not applied at all in some areas, even when
reform does not occur or does not comply fully with Euro-Atlantic standards. It is clear that
there is an interest in delivering military aid to Ukraine, considering that many EU and
NATO member states neighbour the country and are seeking to avoid the conflict from
spilling over. In any case, the international advisory group has provided a format for coor-
dinating reform efforts, as evidenced by the joint support given by the US, EU, and NATO
to the drafting of the national security law in 2018, and could be a useful channel in the
future.
The empirical analysis also shed some light on NWW’s theory in a modern context. It is
clear that the different types of security institutions can play different roles depending on
the context of the LAO. For Ukraine, as is the case for many post-Soviet countries, the
internal security system appears to have a very powerful role maintaining order in the
LAO through their collection and distribution of rents. Aside from the alleged abundant
opportunities for rent-seeking in the military-industrial complex, the military itself does
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not appear to play a large role in perpetuating the LAO. Furthermore, sequencing appears
important in terms of reform targeting the criteria. Impersonal institutions and rules,
which have dominated most of the support to the SBU and police as well as the mili-
tary-industrial complex, are particularly important to focus on ahead of political control,
which has been the main focus of assistance to the military.
While there has been criticism from the Ukrainian elite towards external actors that
wider transformation cannot be effectively pursued during a conflict,43 NWW emphasise
that opening has often happened as an unintended effect of elites opting for select
changes in terms of impersonal institutions. At present, NATO’s support to reform of
the military-industrial complex in Ukraine appears particularly likely to achieve this.
Notes
1. Empirical evidence reveals evident flaws in importing “Western” standards of democratic
civil-military relations, due to shortcomings in knowledge about actual power structures
(Jones and Mychajlyszyn 2002, 376). Moreover, external SSR missions have often been con-
structed in a way that reflected “the classical Weberian model of statehood as an exclusive
template” (Schröder and Chappuis 2014, 134), which may be less fitting in fragile or
conflict-affected states and over short time spans (Schröder and Kode 2012; Schröder 2018).
2. The judiciary plays an essential role in ensuring that elites are held to established credible
conventions and that the rule of law more broadly is upheld (NWW 2009). While this is indis-
putable, this article excludes judicial reform due to space reasons, and focuses more specifi-
cally on impersonal rules for conduct of security forces.
3. Though our framework largely focuses on the interests of domestic elites, it should be noted
that foreign elites/external actors should also not be considered as monolithic and may have
their own potentially diverging interests. External actors may themselves be LAOs or be OAOs
that inadvertently perpetuate the status quo or order closure as a result of their assistance.
4. Civil society has been particularly present in Ukraine’s SSR process since the Maidan revolu-
tion (see Bulakh 2018). For a mapping of all SSR activities in Ukraine by international actors,
see Hanssen (2016).
5. Interview with NATO official, Kyiv, 14 November 2018.
6. Although some degree of reform to its armed forces as well as civilian security agencies had
already begun after Ukraine gained independence in 1991, these efforts were limited in pace
and scope over the following decades (Bugriy and Maksak 2016; DCAF 2017).
7. Interview with NATO official, Kyiv, 14 November 2018.
8. Interview with NATO Information and Documentation Center officials, Kyiv, 14 November
2018.
9. Interview with expert at the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies (CACDS),
Kyiv, 12 November 2018.
10. Interview with expert at the Institute for World Politics, Kyiv, October 2018.
11. Interview with former Ukrainian defence ministry official via Skype, 23 October 2019.
12. While the European Union Border Assistance Mission in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine
(EUBAM) is an EU mission, it does not deal with violent agents or their control and is therefore
excluded from this article.
13. Our analysis limits itself to the potential of SSR support to promote opening based on theor-
etical assumptions and does not attempt to fully analyse reform implementation on the
Ukrainian side or measure actual opening in Ukraine as a result of this. Given the possibility
of unintended consequences of SSR support, measuring actual effects of SSR support on
opening would be an important area of future research.
14. Interview with non-government Kyiv-based think tank expert via Skype, 11 October 2019.
15. Interview with NATO official, Kyiv, 14 November 2018.
16. ibid.
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17. Interview with EU member state diplomat and military attaché, Kyiv, 12 November 2018.
18. Interview with expert at the CACDS, Kyiv, 12 November 2018; Interview with NATO official,
Kyiv, 14 November 2018.
19. Interview with EU Delegation and EUAM officials, Kyiv, 13 November 2018; Interview with
NATO official, Kyiv, November 2018.
20. Interview with former Ukrainian defence ministry official via Skype, 23 October 2019.
21. Interview with EU Delegation and EUAM officials, Kyiv, 13 November 2018; Interview with
non-government Kyiv-based think tank expert via Skype, 11 October 2019.
22. Interview with non-government Kyiv-based think tank expert via Skype, 11 October 2019.
23. ibid.
24. Interview with former Ukrainian ministry of defence official via Skype, 23 October 2019.
25. The US is the largest donor to security and defence reform in Ukraine (DCAF 2017), providing
1.5 billion USD in security assistance between 2014 and 2019 (Gould and Altman 2019).
26. Interview with Kyiv-based think tank expert via Skype, 11 October 2019.
27. Interview with EU/NATO member state military attaché, Kyiv, 12 November 2018.
28. Interview with official from the Ukrainian government office for European and Euro-Atlantic
Integration, Kyiv, 14 November 2018.
29. Interview with government think tank expert, Kyiv, 13 November 2018.
30. Interview with EU Delegation and EUAM officials, Kyiv, 13 November 2018.
31. Interview with EUAM officials, Kyiv, 13 November 2018.
32. This ended the existence of the “militsiya” and other forces subordinated to the Minister of
Interior, such as the Berkut forces that cracked down on the Maidan protest (Fluri and
Badrack 2016, 14–15).
33. ibid.
34. Interview with non-government Kyiv-based think tank expert via Skype, 11 October 2019.
35. Interview with official from the Ukrainian government office for European and Euro-Atlantic
Integration, Kyiv, 14 November 2018; Interview with NATO Information and Documentation
Center officials, Kyiv, 14 November 2018.
36. Interview with NATO official, Kyiv, 14 November 2018.
37. Interview with expert at the CACDS, Kyiv, 12 November 2018.
38. A notable example is the allegation that a senior defence official used Ukroboronprom to
funnel around 100 million UAH of state funds to purchase Russian contraband of unknown
quality between 2015 and 2016 (Bihus.info 2019).
39. Interview with NATO official, Kyiv, 14 November 2018.
40. Interview with expert at the CACDS, Kyiv, 12 November 2018.
41. Ibid.; Interview with NATO official, Kyiv, 14 November 2018.
42. Interview with official from the Ukrainian government office for European and Euro-Atlantic
Integration, Kyiv, 14 November 2018.
43. Interview with expert at the CACDS, Kyiv, 12 November 2018; Interview with government
think tank expert, Kyiv, 13 November 2018.
Acknowledgements
The authors are very grateful to the guest editors of the volume, Antoaneta Dimitrova, Tanja
A. Börzel, and Dimiter Toshkov, as well as the editor, Adam Fagan, for their comments on various
drafts of this article. Anonymous reviewers also provided invaluable feedback. Research for this
article has been supported by the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme of the EU
through two projects: “The European Union and Eastern Partnership Countries – An Inside-Out
Analysis and Strategic Assessment” [EU-STRAT]) under grant agreement number 693382 (www.
eu-strat.eu) and “Europe’s External Action and the Dual Challenges of Limited Statehood and Con-
tested Orders” [EU-LISTCO]) under grant agreement number 769886 (www.eu-listco.net). This article
reflects solely the views of the authors and the European Commission is not responsible for any use
that may be made of the information it contains.
176 E. SHEA AND M. JAROSZEWICZ
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This work was supported by Horizon 2020 Framework Programme [grant number 693382 and grant
number 769886].
Notes on contributors
Elyssa Shea is a research fellow and scientific coordinator at the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political
Science of Freie Universität Berlin. Her research has focused on EU and NATO policies towards
the “Eastern neighbourhood” as well as German security policy. She received a Master of Science
in EU politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Dr. Marta Jaroszewicz is an assistant professor at the Centre of Migration Research of University of
Warsaw and an affiliate research fellow at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). She holds a PhD in
national security from the National Defence University. She previously worked for the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) as a programmemanager (2008–10) and DG NEAR of the European




Ademmer, E., and T. A. Börzel. 2013. “Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EU’s Eastern
Neighbourhood.” Europe-Asia Studies 65: 581–608. doi:10.1080/09668136.2013.766038.
Ademmer, E., J. Langbein, and T. A. Börzel. 2019. “Varieties of Limited Access Orders: The Nexus
Between Politics and Economics in Hybrid Regimes.” Governance. doi:10.1111/gove.12414.
Albrecht, P. 2019. Hybridization, Intervention and Authority: Security Beyond Conflict in Sierra Leone.
London, UK: Routledge.
Ansorg, N., and E. Gordon. 2019. “Co-operation, Contestation and Complexity in Post-Conflict
Security Sector Reform.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 13 (1): 2–24. doi:10.1080/
17502977.2018.1516392.
Bihus.info. 2019. “Army. Friends. Dough. Part 1.” Accessed 5 June 2019. https://bihus.info/army-
friends-dough-part-1.
Bivings, L. 2020. “Ukraine’s Powerful Interior Minister Avakov Under Fire Over Police Reform
Failures.” Atlantic Council, June 30. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-
powerful-interior-minister-avakov-under-fire-over-police-reform-failures/.
Bugriy, M., and H. Maksak. 2016. “The Initial Situation Before Conducting SSR in the Ukraine.” In
Security Sector Reform: Global Case Studies, edited by Robert Ondrejcsak, 64–97. Bratislava:
CENAA.
Bulakh, A. 2018. “Security Sector Reform in Ukraine: Finding the Place for Civil Society.” ICDS
Development Cooperation Project 2016–2018 “RESILIENT UKRAINE: civil society support for
strengthening national resilience and security in Ukraine”. Accessed 6 April 2019. https://icds.
ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ICDS_Analysis-Security_Sector_Reform_in_Ukraine-Anna_
Bulakh-February_2018.pdf.
Buxton, I. 2008. “A First Pillar Perspective on EU and SSR: The Development of a Comprehensive EU
Approach.” In The European Union and Security Sector Reform, edited by Philipp Fluri, and David
Spence, 27–37. London: John Harper Publishing.
EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS 177
Bynander, F. 2011. “Ukrainian Security Identity and NATO Generated SSR.” In The Politics of Security
Sector Reform: Challenges and Opportunities for the European Union’s Global Role, edited by
Magnus Ekengren, and Greg Simons, 155–164. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
DCAF (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance). 2017. “Ukraine SSR Background Note.”
Accessed 17 July 2019. https://issat.dcaf.ch/ser/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/
Ukraine-SSR-Background-Note.
Delcour, L. 2016. “Multiple External Influences and Domestic Change in the Contested
Neighborhood: The Case of Food Safety.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 57 (1): 43–65.
doi:10.1080/15387216.2016.1183220.
Dieniezhna, E. 2020. “Revolution in Defence Procurement: Why is the New Law Important for
Every Ukrainian?” Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO), July 28. https://nako.
org.ua/en/blogs/revolution-in-defence-procurement-why-is-the-new-law-important-for-every-
ukrainian/.
Dowling, A. 2008. “EU Conditionality and Security Sector Reform in the Western Balkans.” In The
European Union and Security Sector Reform, edited by Philipp H. Fluri, and David Spence, 174–
199. London: John Harper Publishing.
Dursun-Ozkanca, O., and A. Vandemoortele. 2012. “The European Union and Security Sector Reform:
Current Practices and Challenges of Implementation.” European Security 21 (2): 139–160. doi:10.
1080/09662839.2012.665881.
EEAS. 2019. “EU-Ukraine Relations – Factsheet.” Accessed 20 December 2019. https://eeas.europa.
eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/4081/eu-ukraine-relations-factsheet_en.
EUAM. 2019. “Kestutis Lancinskas: National Police Fares Well while SBU Still Unreformed.” Accessed
20 July 2020. https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/news/kestutis-lancinskas-national-police-fares-well-
while-sbu-still-unreformed/.
EUAM. 2020. “About Us.” Accessed 1 August 2020. https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/
about-us/.
European Commission. 2009. “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7
May 2009.” Accessed 8 November 2018. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-09-78_en.htm.
European Commission. 2016. “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council.
Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform.” Accessed 20
April 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/joint-communication-ssr-20160705-
p1-854572_en.pdf.
European Commission. 2017a. ‘Eastern Partnership – 20 Deliverables for 2020. Focusing on Key
Priorities and Tangible Results’, Joint Staff Working Document, SWD(2017) 300 final. Accessed
20 November 2019. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/swd_2017_300_f1_joint_staff_
working_paper_en_v5_p1_940530.pdf (accessed 23 April 2018).
European Commission. 2017b. “Annex 1. of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Special
Measure III 2016 on Support to Rule of Law Reforms in Ukraine (PRAVO).” https://ec.europa.eu/
neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eni_2016_039835_action_document_roldocx.pdf.
Fluri, P., and V. Badrack. 2016. Anti-Corruption Measures in Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity: Key
Legislative Aspects. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
Friesendorf, C. 2019. “Police Reform in Ukraine as Institutional Bricolage.” Problems of Post-
Communism 66 (2): 109–122. doi:10.1080/10758216.2017.1351304.
Giustozzi, A. 2011. Art of Coercion: The Primitive Accumulation and Management of Coercive Power.
London: Hurst.
Gollwitzer Franke, S., and M. Quintyn. 2014. “Doorsteps Toward Political and Economic Openness:
Testing the North–Wallis–Weingast Transition Framework.” Emerging Markets Finance and
Trade 50 (4): 212–236. doi:10.2753/REE1540-496X500413.
Gould, J., and H. Altman. 2019. “Here’s What You Need to Know about the US Aid Package to Ukraine
that Trump Delayed.” DefenceNews, September 25. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/
2019/09/25/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-us-aid-package-to-ukraine-that-trump-delayed/.
Gressel, G. 2019. “Guarding the Guardians: Ukraine’s Security and Judicial Reforms under Zelensky.”
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 29. https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/
guarding_the_guardians_ukraine_security_and_judicial_reforms_under_zelensky.
178 E. SHEA AND M. JAROSZEWICZ
Hanssen, M. 2016. International Support to Security Sector Reform in Ukraine. A Mapping of SSR
Projects. Folke Bernadotte Academy. Accessed 4 August 2020. https://fba.se/contentassets/
9f9daa3815ac4adaa88fd578469fc053/international-support-to-security-sector-reform-in-
ukraine---a-mapping-o… .pdf.
Holmov, N. 2018. “Ukraine Passes New Law ‘On National Security’ - What Next?” Eurasia Daily
Monitor, June 26. https://jamestown.org/program/ukraine-passes-new-law-on-national-security-
what-next/.
Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO). 2017. “Making the System Work:
Enhancing Security Assistance to Ukraine.” Accessed 1 August 2020. https://nako.org.ua/en/
publication/security_assistance-en/.
Ivashchenko-Stadnik, K., R. Petrov, P. Rieker, and A. Russo. 2018. “Implementation of the EU’s Crisis
Response in Ukraine.” EUNPACK Deliverable 6.3. Accessed 6 June 2019. http://www.eunpack.eu/
sites/default/files/publications/2018-01-31%20D6.3%20Working%20paper%20on%20implemen
tation%20of%20EU%20crisis%20response%20in%20Ukraine.pdf.
Jackson, P. 2018. “Introduction: Second-Generation Security Sector Reform.” Journal of Intervention
and Statebuilding 12 (1): 1–10. doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1426384.
Jackson, P., and S. Bakrania. 2018. “Is the Future of SSR Non-linear?” Journal of Intervention and
Statebuilding 12 (1): 11–30. doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1426548.
Jacoby, W. 2004. The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in
Central Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Jayasundara-Smits, S. 2018. “From Revolution to Reform and Back: EU-Security Sector Reform in
Ukraine.” European Security 27 (4): 453–468. doi:10.1080/09662839.2018.1523145.
Jayasundara-Smits, S., and L. Schirch. 2015. “EU and Security Sector Reform: Tilting at Windmills.”
WOSCAP Deliverable 2.6, March 31. https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/documents/
downloadPublic?documentIds=080166e5a428e83d&appId=PPGMS.
Jones, C. D., and N. Mychajlyszyn. 2002. “Overview: Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern
Europe in Former Communist Societies.” Armed Forces & Society 28 (3): 375–384. doi:10.1177/
0095327X0202800302.
Kostiuchenko, T., and I. Melnykovska. 2019. “Sustaining Business-State Symbiosis in Times of Political
Turmoil: The Case of Ukraine 2007–2018.” Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History
Yearbook 60 (2): 363–376.
Krieg, A. 2017. Socio-Political Order & Security in the Arab World: From Regime to Public Security.
New York: Palgrave Macmillian.
Langbein, J., and T. A. Börzel. 2013. “Introduction: Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s
Eastern Neighbourhood.” Europe-Asia Studies 65 (4): 571–580. doi:10.1080/09668136.2013.
766042.
Litra, L., I. Medynskyi, and K. Zarembo. 2017. “Assessing the EU’s Conflict Prevention and
Peacebuilding Interventions in Ukraine.” WOSCAP Deliverable 3.4. Accessed 6 June 2019. http://
neweurope.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Case-Study-Report-Ukraine.pdf.
Luckham, R., and T. Kirk. 2013. “The Two Faces of Security in Hybrid Political Orders: A Framework for
Analysis and Research.” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 2 (2): 1–20.
doi:10.5334/sta.cf.
Maass, A.-S. 2019. “From Vilnius to the Kerch Strait: Wide-Ranging Security Risks of the Ukraine
Crisis.” European Politics and Society. doi:10.1080/23745118.2019.1570667.
Melnyk, O., and M. Sungurovsky. 2013. “Security Sector in the Context of General Socio-Political
Situation in Ukraine.” In Almanac on Security Sector Governance in Ukraine, edited by J. L.
Derdzinski, and V. Klymenko, 13–28. Kyiv & Geneva: DCAF, Razumkov Centre.
Melnykovska, I., and R. Schweickert. 2011. “NATO as an External Driver of Institutional Change in
Post-Communist Countries.” Defence and Peace Economics 22 (3): 279–297. doi:10.1080/
10242694.2010.532941.
Meunier, S., and K. Nicolaïdis. 2006. “The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power.” Journal of
European Public Policy 13 (6): 906–925. doi:10.1080/13501760600838623.
EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS 179
Miller, N. 2019. “Mission: Impossible? Ukraine’s New President Ventures To Reform Powerful State
Spy Agency.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, August 17. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-
zelenskiy-reform-state-spy-agency-sbu-/30114589.html.
National Institute for Strategic Studies. 2018. “Концептуальні підходи НАТО та ЄС до забезпечення
стійкості держави і суспільства у сфері національної безпеки.” Аналітична записка.
“Conceptual Approaches of NATO and the EU Towards Sustaining State and Social Resilience
in the National Security Sector” Analytical Notes. Accessed 20 August 2020. https://niss.gov.ua/
sites/default/files/2018-04/NATO-ES-stiykist-59383.pdf.
NATO. 2016. “Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine.” Accessed 12 November 2019.
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_09/20160920_160920-compreh-
ass-package-ukraine-en.pdf.
NATO. 2019a. “Relations with Ukraine.” Accessed 7 February 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/topics_37750.htm#.
NATO. 2019b. “Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission.” Accessed 1 July 2020. https://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_170408.htm.
NATO. 2020. “NATO Recognises Ukraine as Enhanced Opportunities Partner.” Accessed 20
December 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_176327.htm?selectedLocale=en.
North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, S. B. Webb, and B. R. Weingast. 2011. “Limited Access Orders: Rethinking the
Problems of Development and Violence.” January 25. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8053/
5929d17b7e8b83a26dd074122a8beb8dbc32.pdf.
North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework
for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oliker, O., L. E. Davis, K. Crane, A. Radin, C. Gventer, S. Sondergaard, J. T. Quinlivan, et al. 2016.
Security Sector Reform in Ukraine. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Peleschuk, D. 2014. “How a passive police force is fueling Ukraine’s crisis.” GlobalPost, April 29.
https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-29/how-passive-police-force-fueling-ukraine-s-crisis.
Piontkovsky, S. 2020. “Can New Legislation Revive Ukraine’s Defense Reforms?” Atlantic Council,
August 6. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/can-new-legislation-revive-ukraines-
defense-reforms/.
Ponomarenko, I. 2020. “Parliament Passes Law Battling Corruption in Defense Procurement.” Kyiv
Post, July 17. https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/parliament-passes-law-battling-
corruption-in-defense-procurement.html.
Radin, A. 2020. Institution Building in Weak States: The Primacy of Local Politics. Georgetown, DC:
Georgetown University Press.
Roslycky, L., and O. Tregub. 2018. “Why It’s Too Soon to Celebrate Ukraine’s New National Security
Law.” Atlantic Council, July 30. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-it-s-too-
soon-to-celebrate-ukraine-s-new-national-security-law/.
Samokhvalov, V. 2015. “Ukraine Between Russia and the European Union: Triangle Revisited.”
Europe-Asia Studies 67 (9): 1371–1393. doi:10.1080/09668136.2015.1088513.
Schimmelfennig, F., and U. Sedelmeier. 2004. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4): 661–
679. doi:10.1080/1350176042000248089.
Schröder, U. 2014. “The EU Security Sector Reform Agenda: Between Democratic Security
Governance and Internal Security Interests.” S+F, Sicherheit und Frieden – Security and Peace 32
(2): 102–107. doi:10.5771/0175-274x-2014-2-102.
Schröder, U. 2018. “Security”. In The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood, edited
by A. Draude, T. A. Börzel, and T. Risse. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schröder, U., and F. Chappuis. 2014. “New Perspectives on Security Sector Reform: The Role of Local
Agency and Domestic Politics.” International Peacekeeping 21 (2): 133–148. doi:10.1080/
13533312.2014.910401.
Schröder, U., and J. Kode. 2012. “Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform in International State-
Building: Dilemmas of Converging Agendas.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 4: 31–53.
doi:10.1017/S1876404512000036.
180 E. SHEA AND M. JAROSZEWICZ
Schröder, U., F. Chappuis, and D. Kocak. 2013. “Security Sector Reform from a Policy Transfer
Perspective: A Comparative Study of International Interventions in the Palestinian Territories,
Liberia and Timor-Leste.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7 (3): 381–401. doi: 10.1080/
17502977.2013.770255doi: 10.1080/17502977.2013.770255.
Sedra, M. 2006. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide Towards Expediency.” International
Peacekeeping 13 (1): 94–110. doi:10.1080/13533310500424868.
Sedra, M. 2013. “The Hollowing-Out of the Liberal Peace Project in Afghanistan: The Case of Security
Sector Reform.” Central Asian Survey 32 (3): 371–387. doi:10.1080/02634937.2013.843387.
Sherr, J. 2001. “Security, Democracy, and ‘Civil Democratic Control’ of Armed Forces in Ukraine.”
Conflict Studies Research Centre. Accessed 20 December 2020. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/
97628/01_Jan.pdf.
Simons, G. 2012. “Security Sector Reform and Georgia: The European Union’s Challenge in the
Southern Caucasus.” European Security 21 (2): 272–293. doi:10.1080/09662839.2012.665887.
Tilly, C. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Transparency International. 2018. “Transparency International Ukraine Supports MPS’ Initiative to
Prevent SBU from Pressuring Business.” April 26. https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/transparency-
international-ukraine-supports-mps-initiative-to-prevent-sbu-from-pressuring-business/.
Tregub, O. 2018. “New Law on National Security: What Will Change in the Defence Sector?”
Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO), June 27. https://nako.org.ua/en/blogs/
new-law-on-national-security-what-will-change-in-the-defence-sector/.
Tytarchuk, O., and M. Khylko. 2016. “NATO, the EU and the OSCE in the Handling of the Russia-
Ukraine Conflict: Competitive Synergy or ‘Freezing’ Crisis Management?” In International Crisis
Management: NATO, EU, OSCE and Civil Society, edited by S. Goda, O. Tytarchuk, and M. Khylko,
87–100. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Ustinova, O., and S. Pifer. 2019. “Time to Play Hardball on Reforming Ukraine’s Security Service.”
Atlantic Council, March 28. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/time-to-play-
hardball-on-reforming-ukraine-s-security-service/.
Whitman, R. 2002. “The Fall, and Rise of Civilian Power in Europe?” National Europe Centre Paper No.
16, Canberra: Austrian National University.
Wulf, H. 2011. “Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries Revisited.” In
Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II, edited by B. Austin, M. Fischer,
and H. J. Giessmann, 337–57. Opladen and Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
Zarembo, K. 2017. “Perceptions of CSDP Effectiveness in Ukraine: A Host State Perspective.”
European Security 26 (2): 190–206. doi:10.1080/09662839.2017.1291502.
EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS 181
